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Torts—Damages—Liability of Automobile Owner When Dece•
dent's Spouse Covenants Not to Sue Negligent Driver—Plath v.
Justus.'—Plaintiff's wife was killed when she was struck by an auto-
mobile owned by the defendant and driven by one Moses. The plain-
tiff and the allegedly negligent driver entered into a settlement agree-
ment whereby Plath agreed not to institute any legal action against
Moses. The plaintiff did, however, incorporate into the settlement
agreement with the driver a clause which reserved "any and all
rights"2
 against any other person who might be liable for his wife's
death. Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced an action pursuant to New
York's wrongful death statute° against Justus, the owner of the car,
seeking damages for the death of his wife. This claim against Justus
was based upon Section 388 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic
Law,4
 which imposes liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle for
the negligence of any person operating the vehicle with the express or
implied permission of the owner. The defendant moved to dismiss the
complaint, contending that the plaintiff's settlement with the driver,
the active tortfeasor, also released him from any liability since he was
not a joint tortfeasor, his liability being solely vicarious and second-
ary.6
The Supreme Court of Rensselaer County, New York denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss. the action and concluded that the agree-
ment between the parties was not a release, but rather a covenant not
to sue which did not relieve the owner of liability .° The Supreme Court
of New York, Appellate Division, affirmed this decision,' and the
defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, in a unanimous decision, held that the lower courts did not
err in failing to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint .°
In Plath, the New York Court of Appeals was confronted with
the issue of whether an instrument, termed a covenant not to sue by
the parties and executed between the plaintiff and the active tortfeasor,
which expressly reserved all rights against any other person who might
1 28 N.Y.2d 16 (1971).
2 Id.
3 N.Y. Estates, Powers and Trusts Law § 5-4.1 (McKinney 1967).
4 N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (McKinney 1970) provides:
Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and
responsible for death or injuries to a person or property resulting from negli-
gence in the use or operation of such vehicle, in the business of such owner or
otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, ex-
press or implied, of such owner. Whenever any vehicles as hereinafter defined
shall be used in combination with another, by attachment or tow, the person
using or operating any one vehicle shall, for the purposes of this section, be
deemed to be using or operating each vehicle in the combination, and the own-
ers thereof shall be jointly and severally liable hereunder.
5 See Sarine v. American Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 258 App. Div. 653, 17
N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
28 N.Y.2d at 23.
7 Plath V. Justus, 33 App. Div. 2d 833, 306 N.Y.S.2r1 80 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
8 28 N.Y.2d 16 (1971),
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be Liable for the alleged injury, should be regarded as a general release
of all parties or merely as a covenant having no effect upon the statu-
tory vicarious liability of the automobile owner. While the release and
the covenant not to sue are similar in that they both have the effect
of relieving a potential defendant of liability, nevertheless, the two
instruments produce different consequences in terms of their total
effect upon the plaintiff's possible causes of action. It is settled that a
release extinguishes a cause of action.' On the other hand, a covenant
not to sue is not so broad; it does not effect the viability of the cause
of action nor does it pardon alI joint tortfeasors." Rather, it acts as a
defense to any rights the plaintiff might assert against specific cove-
nantees to the instrument." While the parties may label their agree-
ment either a covenant not to sue or a release, many courts are in
agreement that the exact nature of the instrument in issue is to be
determined by referring to the circumstances and intent surrounding
the execution of the agreement." In view of this judicial approach it
is important to determine the legal relationship between the potential
defendants. If those who may be liable for the plaintiff's injuries are
joint tortfeasors, the judicial tendency is to treat an agreement by the
plaintiff not to pursue one tortfeasor as a covenant not to sue." There-
fore, an instrument executed between the plaintiff and one joint tort-
feasor in which the plaintiff either expressly or impliedly reserves his
rights against another joint tortfeasor, will be regarded as a covenant
not to sue, and the plaintiff will be deemed to have intended to retain
his cause of action against the non-covenantee defendant." On the
other hand, where an agreement between the plaintiff and the released
party is such that the court believes that it was intended as full satis-
faction of all claims, the instrument will be treated as a full release of
all joint tortfeasors, despite any express reservation of rights."' This
judicial attitude is obviously based upon the policy that a plaintiff may
obtain only one full recovery for his injuries.
In the situation where the released party and the defendant are
not joint tortfeasors, but rather where the defendant's liability is only
vicarious, for instance in the master-servant situation, the law is un-
settled as to the effect of an instrument executed by the plaintiff
releasing the active tortfeasor but reserving his rights against the
vicariously liable defendant. Many jurisdictions have adopted the
rule that an agreement not to pursue the active wrongdoer will auto-
matically release a secondary tortfeasor regardless of any reservation
10 See, e.g., Note, 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1030, 1031 (1969).
to Id.; see also, Note, 28 Ohio State L.J. 537, 540 (1967).
11 See note 10 supra.
12 See Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 403, 425 (1960) and cases cited therein.
ts 76 C.J.S. Release § 50(a) (2) (1952).
14
 See Martin v. Burney, 160 Fla. 183, 34 So. 2d 36 (1948) ; Hulke v. International
Mfg. Co., 14 11!. App. 2d 5, 31, 142 N.E.2d 717, 731 (1957).
15
 See Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351, 359, 146 A.2d 665, 669 (1958).
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of rights by the plaintiff." The decisions in these jurisdictions are
founded upon the belief that it would be inequitable to permit the
plaintiff to institute an action against a party whose liability is de-
pendent upon the negligence of a previously exonerated tortfeasor.
Other jurisdictions, however, have not adopted this rule, but consider
the intent of the parties controlling even when the defendant's liability
is vicarious.17
 Therefore, in these latter states, an instrument contain-
ing an express reservation of rights will be construed as a covenant
not to sue, and will not terminate the derivative liability of the re-
maining tortfeasor. This was the approach of the New York Court of
Appeals in construing the instrument between the plaintiff and the
allegedly negligent driver in Plath. It is submitted that the court, in
rejecting the harsh automatic release rule and adopting those decisions
which focus upon intent as the critical factor determinative of the
instrument's effect, has taken the more reasoned and equitable ap-
proach.
Prior to 1924, a New York automobile owner was not liable for
the negligence of an operator of his motor vehicle unless a master-
servant relationship could be established." This rule was based upon
the judicial policy that an injured person should pursue his remedy
against the party whose negligence actually caused his injuries.' 0 How-
ever, in 1924, the New York Legislature enacted what is now Section
388 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law." The purpose of this statute was
to provide a person injured by a negligently operated motor vehicle
some recourse to a financially responsible party. 2' The legislature
accomplished this result by statutorily imputing to an automobile
owner the negligence of one operating his automobile with his per-
mission. In view of the fact that New York has a system of compulsory
automobile insurance 22 presumably rendering all automobile owners
financially responsible, it was believed that by making all automobile
owners liable for the negligence of their operators, injured plaintiffs
would be assured of an adequate tort remedy. The liability imposed
by section 388 is purely vicarious and thus not based upon any fault
of the owner. Clearly, the legislature's sole purpose in enacting the
statute was to protect injured plaintiffs against financially irresponsible
defendants.
In Plath, a case of first impression in New York, the court was
18 See, e.g., Simpson v. Townsley, 283 F.2d 743, 746, 748 (10th Cir. 1960) ; Bacon
v. United States, 321 F.2d 880, 824 (8th Cir. 1963); Holcomb v. Flavin, 34 III. 2d 558,
216 N.E.2d 811 (1966).
17
 See, e.g., Ellis v. Jewett Rhodes Motor Co., 29 Cal. App. 2d 395, 84 P.2d 791
(1938) ; Wilson v. City of New York, 131 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1954).
18 See Potts v. Pardee, 220 N.Y. 431, 116 N.E. 78 (1917).
18 Id.
20 N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (McKinney 1970).
21
 See Continental Auto Lease Corp. v. Campbell, 19 N.Y.2d 350, 280 N.Y.S.2d 123,
227 N.E.2d 28 (1967).
22 N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law 310 et seq. (McKinney 1970).
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squarely confronted with the issue of determining the effect of an
agreement not to sue upon the vicarious liability of an automobile
owner under Section 388. of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. The court,
unanimously construing the instrument as a covenant not to sue,
held that it could not be asserted as a defense to an automobile owner's
liability. In reaching its decision, the court favored the rule of con-
struction which treats an agreement as a covenant not to sue when
there is an express reservation of rights against a vicariously liable
party. In attempting to ascertain the true intent of the parties, the
court emphasized two factors as important. First, the parties in-
corporated an express reservation of rights clause in their agreement."
The court found that this clause clearly established that the plaintiff
did not intend to exonerate all wrongdoers, but only the negligent
driver. The opinion pointed to the policy, adopted by the lower courts
of New York, that instruments reserving rights against a passive
tortfeasor constitute covenants not to sue rather than general releases,
and indicate an express intent by the plaintiff to maintain his action
against that person. In this regard, the court was influenced by
Boucher v. Thomsen," an important decision on this issue by the
Supreme Court of Michigan. In Boucher, the plaintiff's husband was
struck and killed by an automobile owned by the defendant and
operated by one Franck with the permission of the owner. The plain-
tiff and driver settled the case and executed an agreement which stated
that the plaintiff reserved his right to proceed against any other person
who might be liable for her husband's death. Thomsen, the owner,
claimed that this agreement released him from all liability. The Mich-
igan court, concluding that Thomsen was not released, relied primarily
upon the language of the settlement agreement which, in the court's
opinion, clearly evidenced an intent not to release the owner of the
automobile."
As a second important factor bearing upon the issue of intent,
the Plath court indicated that the covenant with the driver was only
for a portion of the entire claim."•From this fact, the court implied an
intention by the plaintiff to preserve his cause of action against the
owner for the remainder of his damages. Other courts have followed
this approach by concluding that exoneration from all liability is de-
pendent upon whether the sum paid to the plaintiff amounted to a full
satisfaction for his injuries.27
 Utilizing this approach, the amount paid
in settlement could well be conclusive as to the parties' intent. In
Plath, the driver gave the plaintiff only a partial payment for his
injuries as consideration for the covenant not to sue. Examining the
as 28 N.Y.2d at 22.
24 328 Mich. 312, 43 N.W.2d 866 (1950).
25 328 Mich. at 321-22, 43 N.W.2d at 870.
26 28 N.Y.2d at 22-3.
27 Clapper v. Original Tractor Cab Co., 270 F.2d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1959) ; Mc-
Kenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943) ; Gronguist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119,
127, 64 N.W.2d 159, 165 (1954).
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problem in this fashion, it was easy for the court to conclude that the
plaintiff intended to gain the remaining compensation for her injuries
by means of an action against the automobile owner.
In its most basic terms, the Plath decision conflicts with the rule
applied by a large number of other jurisdictions. 28 These latter deci-
sions adhere to the strict rule that any agreement in which a plaintiff
releases an active tortfeasor is also to be construed as releasing one
secondarily liable, notwithstanding the existence of any reservation of
rights clause. The reasoning upon which this harsh automatic release
rule is based is twofold: first, such a rule avoids the problem of
circuity of action; and second, since the liability of the secondary
wrongdoer is completely derivative, a release of the negligent party
automatically prohibits any imputation of negligence to the secondary
wrongdoer." Applying these reasons to the Plath situation, the sub-
stantial weaknesses of the automatic release rule become apparent.
Jurisdictions favoring the automatic release rule were fearful that
by construing an instrument executed in settlement as a covenant not
to sue, they would only be creating a roundabout cause of action for
indemnity by the vicariously liable party. The injured party would
recover initially from the inactive wrongdoer; then, the latter would
bring an action against the active tortfeasor for indemnification. This
approach would necessitate two lawsuits instead of one. However, the
fear of multiple litigation does not exist in Plath because of the exis-
tence of New York's automobile liability insurance law which requires
that every owner of a motor vehicle be insured." Under this compul-
sory system of insurance, the standard automobile insurance policy
issued in New York is read as containing a provision insuring the
owner against liability arising from the negligence of one operating
the vehicle with the owner's permission. 3 ' Because of this coverage,
while New York courts have recognized that an automobile owner
has a right of indemnification against a negligent operator," they have
nevertheless held that the owner can be indemnified only when he is
exposed to liability beyond the limits of his insurance policy." In
every other instance, no indemnification will be allowed in favor of
a vicariously liable car owner since both the owner and driver are
covered by the same insurance policy." The reasoning behind this
rule is clear. If indemnification were allowed, the insurance company
would pay the judgment against its insured, subrogate to his rights, and
then attempt to collect from the driver, who is insured under the same
policy and for whom the insurance company is -bound to pay.
28 See note 16 supra.
21; See Holcomb v. Flavin, 34 Ill. 2d 558, 216 N.E.2d 811 (1966).
80 N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 310 at seq. (McKinney 1970).
31 N.Y. Insurance Law § 167(2) (McKinney 1966)."
32 Naso v. Lafata, 4 N.Y.2d 585, 176 N.Y.S.2d 622, 152 N.E.2d 59 (1958).
as Ammann v. Devinney, 62 Misc. 2d 255, 308 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
a4 For a full discussion of this issue, see McLaughlin, Civil Practice, 20 Syr. L.
Rev. 449, 474 (1969).
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This rule of indemnification was emphasized in Beck v. Renahan,"
a tort action in which an insured automobile owner's vehicle had been
negligently operated by a third party driving the vehicle with the
owner's consent. The owner was insured under the standard New
York automobile liability insurance policy which covered both the
named insured and any person using the vehicle with his permission.
In a suit by the automobile owner for indemnification, the court held
that the insurance company had no action as a subrogee against the
active tortfeasor for indemnification because there is no subrogation
against an insured;" under the policy the driver qualified as an in-
sured.37
 In its opinion, the court stated: "An insurer clearly may be
subrogated to its insured's claims against a third party who tortiously
causes the loss, but no subrogation exists against the insured or co-
insured whose negligence caused the loss."" If the owner's liability is
completely covered by his insurance policy, impleader will not be per-
mitted because the damage is covered by insurance, and any recovery
over by the owner against the operator would be tantamount to a wind-
fall. Therefore, in Plath, the fear of circuity of action is not a relevant
factor to be considered in determining the effect of the settlement in-
strument executed between the parties.
Two other results flow from the policy of permitting no indemnifi-
cation from third party operators. First, it gives substantial strength
to covenants not to sue. When an injured party releases a covenantee
after settling on an amount of recovery, the probable intent of those
parties would be that the covenantee be dropped completely from the
action. The Plath case gives this full protection to the covenantee by
preventing indemnification. Secondly, by not permitting the insurance
company to recover over against a third party, New York is protecting
its compulsory insurance policy. If the insurance company were per-
mitted to institute an action against its own insured, the underlying
purpose of insurance would be frustrated."
The reasoning behind automatically exonerating the vicariously
liable defendant also appears weak when the rule's total effect upon
an instrument is considered. When an injured party and the active
tortfeasor enter into. an
 agreement, expressly reserving rights for the
plaintiff against others, the sum settled upon undoubtedly constitutes
a partial satisfaction of the plaintiff's damages. If this partial settle-
ment is to be treated as an automatic release of all potentially liable
parties, the injured plaintiff will not obtain full redress for his in-
juries. Rather, the benefit of the agreement will be extended to legally
responsible wrongdoers whom the parties to the instrument never in-
tended to release. On the other hand, under the better approach ad-
36 46 Misc. 2d 252, 259 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. 1965),
36 46 Misc. 2d at 254-55, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 771.
3T 46 Misc. 2d at 254, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 770.
38 46 Misc. 2d at 254, 159 N.Y.S.2d at 770-71.
39 Sec Vescera v. Dancy, 52 Misc. 2d 830, 277 N.Y.S.2d 37 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
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vocated in Plath, the court will construe the instrument according to
the intent of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the agree-
ment. In this way, the court will consider both the amount received
and the intended benefit in deciding whether vicarious liability is to
be continued or released. The Plath interpretation is clearly the more
persuasive and equitable of the two approaches.
Finally, the automatic release rule would also discourage the set-
tlement of controversies. In a jurisdiction which interprets a covenant
not to sue as a complete release, an injured plaintiff would hesitate to
settle unless he were certain to receive full satisfaction for his injuries.
Otherwise, he might forfeit both his cause of action and the balance
of his remedy by settling with the active tortfeasor. The result would
be that many of these previously privately settled claims would have
to be handled by the already overburdened courts.
In conclusion, the effect of the Plath decision is to move away
from the strict rule of law favoring complete exoneration toward a
more functional analysis of the intention behind the agreement. By
focusing upon the circumstances and consideration of the agreement,
the court has rendered an equitable decision not possible in jurisdic-
tions where the automatic release rule is applied. However, the Plath
decision is a limited result in that New York's insurance laws protect
the operator of the automobile from any responsibility to indemnify
the owner. In other situations not involving insurance, this would not
be so and the covenantee would still have to indemnify a vicariously
liable owner. But this limitation does not affect the real significance
of the decision which lies in its emphasis on intent; agreements should
be construed as often as possible according to the wishes of the parties.
JOHN B. JOHNSON
1284
